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I.  I.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The question of whether there exists an empirical link between nominal money
and real output has been subjected to a variety of modern econometric techniques that
produce conflicting results.  For example, Stock and Watson (1989) employ a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model that accounts for several important economic variables and
find that money exerts a significant effect on real economic activity.  Friedman and
Kuttner (1992,1993), on the other hand, find that using the same specification as Stock
and Watson but extending the sample through the 1980s obviates the money-income link.
Friedman and Kuttner’s results indicate that interest rates are relatively more useful in
explaining movements in output.
1 Thoma (1994) also reports that changes in money have
a statistically insignificant impact on output in the U.S.  
Empirical results such as these have found support in recent studies, both
theoretical and empirical, in which money is shown to have little or no direct affect on
economic cycles.  Rudebusch and Svensson (1999, 2000), for example, show that the
behavior of money (real or nominal) has no marginally significant impact on deviations
of real output from potential (the output gap) once past movements in the gap and real
rates of interest are accounted for.  These findings are based on what Meyer (2001) refers
to as the “consensus macro model” and have achieved an influential position among
macroeconomists and policymakers.
2
                                                          
1 The importance of interest rates has been questioned in a number of studies.  For instance, Bernanke
(1990) reports that the significance of the interest rate variable declines throughout the 1980s.  Hafer and
Kutan (1997) demonstrate that the impact of interest rates on output and the apparent decline in money’s
importance through the 1980s is largely a function of the stationarity assumption used.
2 This consensus model usually can be written as a three-equation dynamic system, including an aggregate
demand equation, a Phillips curve and a monetary policy rule.  In this model, aggregate demand
movements are driven by past deviations of output from potential and changes in the real rate of interest.2
Other studies challenge the finding that money does not affect real output.  An
early study by Christiano and Ljungqvist (1988) uses a bivariate VAR model and report
evidence supporting the existence of a statistically significant money-to-output relation.
Davis and Tanner (1997), using monthly U.S. data extending back to the mid-1800’s,
find that even after interest rate affects are allowed for, money remains statistically
significant in explaining short-run movements in real output.  Employing a rolling
regression approach, Swanson (1998) also finds a statistically significant relation
between money—measured as simple sum aggregates and as Divisia measures—and
output, even after an interest rate spread variable is added to the model. Hafer and Kutan
(1997) consider whether different stationarity properties of the data have influenced
reported outcomes.  Since most prior studies assume difference stationarity, Hafer and
Kutan demonstrate that estimating VAR models that include money and interest rate
variables under the existence of trend stationarity can dramatically affect the conclusion.
Indeed, they find that using a trend-stationarity assumption yields the finding that money
significantly affects real output in the U.S.
A common characteristic of this literature is the focus on the United States.  There
are a few exceptions.  For example, Krol and Ohanian (1990) test the Stock-Watson
specification using data for Canada, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.  They find
that while money (actual and detrended) significantly affects output in the U.K., there is
no such affect in Japan, Canada and Germany.  They conclude that while detrending the
growth rate of U.S. money impacts conclusions about the role of money, little is gained
                                                                                                                                                                            
As such, monetary policy works only indirectly through the interest rate channel.  For other treatments of
this model, see McCallum (2000).  It should be noted that Nelson (2000) provides empirical estimates that
refute the findings of Rudebusch and Svensson, at least for the United Kingdom and the United States.3
when this approach is applied to the other countries.  Another exception is a recent study
by Hayo (1999). Using data from 14 European Union (EU) countries plus Canada, Japan,
and the U.S., he finds that money-output test results are not sensitive to the use of data in
levels versus data in differences.  While these studies represent a broader analysis, they
too focus on the money-output relation in relatively industrialized, financially developed
countries.
An obvious question to ask is whether nominal money is relatively more useful
than interest rates in explaining movements in real output across a wide variety of
countries that includes industrial and developing economies. To address this question, we
estimate an unconstrained, four-variable (output, money, prices and interest rates) VAR
model for a sample of 20 industrialized and developing countries.
3  In addition to casting
a wider net in terms of counties to analyze, it is important to determine whether the
statistical importance (or lack thereof) of money is a function of the definition of money
used.  Thus our investigation compares the usefulness of both a narrow (M1) and broad
(M2) measure of money in addition to a short-term interest rate.
4  We explore the
sensitivity of our results to the use of different stationarity assumptions.  Unlike previous
work, we assess the empirical results by considering the financial development of the
countries used.  To this end the recent data set constructed by Beck, et al. (1999) is
employed to investigate a potential link between financial development and our empirical
results. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Where Rudebusch and Svensson find that M2 has no predictive power over output in the U.S., Nelson
finds that movements in the St. Louis adjusted monetary base do.
3 Hayo (1999) uses a similar VAR model.
4 Nelson’s (2000) work demonstrates that conclusions about money are subject to this concern.4
The format of the paper is to first briefly discuss the econometric issues involved
with the use of trend and difference stationary data in Section II.  In Section III the data
are described along with the specification of the estimated VARs.  This section also
presents the estimation results.  Measures of financial market development and structure
are then examined to see if there is a discernible pattern between the importance of
money in explaining real output and a country’s financial development.  Some tentative
conclusions and policy implications close the paper in Section IV.
II.  ECONOMETRIC ISSUES
This paper adopts the approach of using both stationary (with and without trend)
and difference stationary (DS) specifications of the VAR model. Our motivation for the
use of stationary and difference-stationary assumptions stems from evidence indicating
that unit root tests may falsely indicate difference stationarity.  A number of studies have
questioned the use of difference stationarity due to the low power of unit root tests.  For
example, Dejong, et al. (1992) show that the power of augmented Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Perron tests against the alternative null hypothesis of trend stationarity is quite
low.  Dejong and Whiteman (1991) employ Bayesian analysis to test for the presence of a
unity root in the data and report mixed results: When a zero-trend prior is assigned to
trend-stationary alternatives, the data do not reject the presence of a unit root in the data.
Relaxing this prior, however, often leads to rejection of the unit-root hypothesis.
Rudebusch (1993) also reports that unit-root tests cannot distinguish between data
simulated by a trend-stationary model or a difference-stationary model.  In a more recent
paper, Canova (1998) studies the business cycle properties of a small set of real
macroeconomic time series for period 1955-1986.  He finds that using different5
detrending techniques, including a linear time trend and first-order differences, produces
different – both quantitatively and qualitatively – “stylized facts” of U.S. business cycles.
Concern about the stationarity properties of the data is important because of the
economic implications.  If money and real output are characterized by a difference-
stationary model, then effects of monetary shocks on real output diminish very slowly.
In other words, a monetary shock has a permanent impact on the level of output, because
the shock affects the stochastic component of real output. If the money and output series
are represented by a stationary model, however, then money shocks have only a
transitory impact on output since they are mean reverting.  Our own work (1997)
suggests that the outcome from testing the money-output link for the U.S. is sensitive to
which model is used.  This paper thus extends this line of inquiry to a broad sample of
countries.   
III.  DATA AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
The data used in this paper are quarterly observations of money, measured as a
narrow (M1) and a broad (M2) aggregate; real output, measured as real GDP ($1990); the
price level, measured as the CPI (1990=100); and a short-term government interest rate.
Complete descriptions of the data and sample periods used are provided in the data
appendix.  We use the CPI to increase the sample of countries:  Using the GDP deflator
results in a reduction in country coverage.  All data are taken from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM release as of December 1998.  Country-
specific sample periods are dictated by the availability of data.  In determining the
country sample, we used the ad hoc rule that countries with fewer than ten years of data
are omitted.  This criterion and data availability results in a sample of 20 countries, a6
sample that extends the usual range of economic settings in which the relative impacts of
money and interest rates on real output is tested. 
To provide some background information for the economic diversity of the
sample, Table 1 provides summary statistics on real output growth, inflation and money
growth for the countries in the sample.  As one can quickly see, the sample covers a
broad set of economic experiences.  For example, average real output growth ranges from
about 1.7 percent in Switzerland to a high of 6.8 percent in Singapore.  This range is
dwarfed by that for inflation.  In our sample, inflation runs from less than 2 percent to
more than 50 percent.  Interestingly, money growth, measured as M1 or as M2, also
exhibits a range similar to that of inflation.  Indeed, if one believes that in the long run
money growth and inflation move one-for-one, then such an outcome is expected.
Finding such a close relation between money growth and inflation across countries over
time also would suggest that there is little relation between money growth and the growth
of real output in the long run.  And that is what the data in Table 1 suggests.
5  Even
though the data do not suggest a reliable long-run relation between average money
growth and real output growth, that does not preclude the existence of a short-run
relation.  To a large extent that is the question address in the remainder of this paper.
Estimation results
Three VAR models are estimated for each country.  The first of these is a levels
specification without a deterministic trend.  The second VAR specification includes a
                                                          
5 Running a regression of real output growth on money growth across countries results in an estimated
coefficient on money growth of 0.04 for M1 and M2.  Neither estimate is statistically significant at the 5
percent level.  Conversely, a regression of inflation on money growth yields estimated coefficients of 1.02
for M1 and 0.97 for M2, both significant at well below the one-percent level of significance.   This result
supports the belief that, on average, increasing money growth does not permanently increase real output7
linear, deterministic time trend.  This model is referred to as the TS specification.  This
version assumes that series are stationary around a deterministic trend term. Both
stationary specifications use the log level of the data (except for the interest rate) and
allow us to test whether the impact of money on output, if there is any, is transitory.
6
Furthermore, TS model allows us to interpret the results in terms of “detrended” variables
(Krol and Ohanian, 1990). The third specification uses log first-differences of the data,
except the interest rate, which is measured as a simple first-difference.  In this difference
stationary (DS) model any impact of money on output is viewed as long-lasting, since the
series are assumed to have stochastic trends with fluctuations that are not mean reverting
over time.  In all VARs, a constant term and quarterly seasonal dummies are included.
7
Before turning to the results, a brief discussion of lag length selection is in order.
Swanson (1998) notes that many studies select the structure of the VAR by simply
assigning ad hoc lag lengths.  It is well known that inferences drawn from VARs are
sensitive to the lag length used.
8 In this paper the lag structure for each country’s VAR is
chosen using the Akaike AIC and the Schwarz SC criteria.  To keep the analysis
manageable, three alternative lag lengths were tested (eight, six and four) for each
monetary aggregate and for each stationarity assumption.  In all but two cases, both lag-
length-selection criteria select four lags.  The exceptions are the TS model using M1 for
                                                                                                                                                                            
growth, but is more likely to lead to higher inflation.  For a similar analysis and a review of the relevant
literature, see Dwyer and Hafer (1999). 
6 In this model causality tests are (asymptotically) valid only if the series are stationary or if they are jointly
difference stationary and cointegrated.  If they are nonstationary and not cointegrated, standard Granger F-
tests are not valid because of incorrect distributional properties.  On this point, see Sims, Stock and Watson
(1990).
7 We searched for apparent structural breaks in data. Time-series plots of the data indicated a significant
break for M1 for Finland during the second quarter of 1991.  Therefore, for Finland, the estimated VAR
models with M1 include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 starting from 91:II to present and zero
otherwise.
8 See, among others, Hafer and Sheehan (1991) and the articles cited therein.8




Variance decompositions derived from the VARs provide information on the
quantitative importance of money and interest rates in explaining output. 
10  In this paper
we focus on the relative proportion of the total variation in output explained by money
and interest rates.  Consequently, we do not report the full set of variance decompositions
(VDC) results.
11  For each country, six sets of variance decompositions are presented.
These combinations reflect (a) the three VAR specifications and (b) the fact that we use
two alternative orderings of the variables for each VAR.  One version, labeled as
“Ordering 1” in subsequent discussion, uses the ordering interest rate, money, prices and
real output.  As suggested by Sims (1980) and discussed in Todd (1990), an ordering that
places the short-term interest rate first assumes little contemporaneous feedback from
output to money.  Because there are different priors about the presence of
contemporaneous feedback from output to money or interest rates, an alternative ordering
of output, prices, interest rate and money is estimated as a robustness test.  This is
referred to as “Ordering 2.”  All reported variance decompositions use a 4-year horizon.
12  
                                                          
9 A complete listing of the lag-length test results is available on request.
10 In an earlier version of this paper we also reported Wald tests. These tests may be viewed as “within-
sample” tests, because they do not provide an indication of the dynamic characteristics of variables in the
system and their usefulness is limited to the sample period used. As a result, we rely on variance
decompositions, which may be considered as out-of-sample tests, to gauge the relative strength of money
and interest rates on output. For further discussion of these issues, see Masih and Masih (2001). We would
like to thank the referee for encouraging us to take this approach.
11 The complete set of results is available upon request.
12 Increasing the horizon does not affect the qualitative outcomes reported.9
The variance decompositions using M1 are found in Table 2.
13  There are two
aspects to interpreting the array of results in Table 2.  First, beneath each column heading
is listed a ratio:  the numerator is the VDC for M1 and the denominator is the VDC for
the interest rate.  Second, this ratio is reported for the two orderings discussed above.
Last, because of the large number of combinations run, it is useful to establish some
criterion for evaluating the results.  In this paper the following set-up is used:  When the
VDC of money exceeds 10 percent and exceeds the VDC for the interest rate by 5
percent (not percentage points), the result appears in a shaded box.  Although one may
quibble that an alternative benchmark should be used, we believe that our choice is
reasonable, and one that sets an acceptable minimum for money to be thought of as
providing useful information about the behavior of real output.
The results in Table 2 provide an interesting comparison to previous work that
has focused on the U.S.  First, the results indicate that when the stationary specification
without trend is used, M1’s VDC exceeds that of the interest rate for Germany, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore and Switzerland, although this finding is
sensitive to the ordering in New Zealand and Singapore.  This suggests that M1 plays
only a minor role relative to interest rates in explaining output in most other countries
included in our sample. 
                                                          
13 For ease of presentation, we report only the VDC results for money and interest rates.  A full set of
results is available upon request.  One could also consider the impact of exchange rates on output within
our VAR model. We believe that domestic interest rate captures this impact through interest parity
relationship, which states that id – if = e where id and if are domestic and foreign interest rates, and e is the
expected change in the exchange rate.  Assuming that the parity relationship holds, which is a reasonable
assumption, because of the increasing level of world capital mobility, domestic interest rates may capture
the foreign influences such as changes in foreign interest rates and exchange rates.  In case of a fixed
exchange rate regime, using exchange rates is not relevant.  Therefore, our VAR models do not include
exchange rates10
 Turning to the results based on the TS and DS specifications, the evidence for the
U.S. corroborates our earlier finding (1997) that the VDC of M1 increases in absolute
size and is larger than the interest rate when the TS specification is used relative to the
DS model.  As seen in Table 1, the TS specification delivers a VDC for M1 indicating
that about one-fourth of the variance in real output is explained by money, compared with
around 13-17 percent for the interest rate.  When the DS specification is used, however,
the results are dramatically altered.  Now the interest rate dominates M1, the latter
accounting for less than 3 percent of the variance in output.
14  Finding that the
importance of money is affected by the specification occurs not only for the U.S., but
also for Australia, Israel, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.  In other words, in these seven
countries one would have rejected the usefulness of money based on the TS or DS
specification alone when this conclusion is reversed using the alternative model.
15  Thus
country-specific analyses must recognize the likelihood that model specification can
significantly impact the conclusions reached.
One of the most interesting outcomes in Table 2 is the robustness of results for
Germany, New Zealand, and Switzerland.  For those countries the VDC evidence
indicates that money exceeds the variance in real output accounted for by the interest rate
regardless of specification and ordering.  Is there an explanation for this outcome?  An
                                                          
14 It is unresolved in the literature whether the interest rate should be included in its level of first-
differenced for.  For example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) argue that first-differencing the interest rate in
a VAR model is questionable.  Because there is no agreed-to procedure in instances such as this, we also
estimated the DS specification where the interest rate is included in its level form.  These results were, for
the most part, led to the same conclusions as the DS specification.  Only in the case of Mexico were the
results markedly different from those reported in Table 2.  In that case using the DS specification with
levels of the interest rate produced an M1 VDC that was larger than that for the interest rate, and exceeded
10 percent.  Complete results using this specification are available upon request.
15 One could argue that a similar conclusion could be drawn for Canada and the Netherlands.  However, in
those cases a change in the VAR ordering also changes the finding, suggesting that the sensitivity of
money’s role is explained by more than just the use of the TS or DS specifications.11
obvious one is that Germany and Switzerland are recognized as countries in which the
central bank follows a credible low-inflation policy.  Such policy actions also have
occurred, though more recently, in New Zealand.
16  In such a policy environment,
movements of money may be more exogenous to output than in policy regimes where
money growth is secondary to controlling interest rates as a means to stabilize economic
activity.  Below we investigate other potential explanations for this outcome, ones that
focus on the development and structure of the countries’ financial markets.
Table 3 presents the battery of outcomes with M2 replacing M1.  The U.S. results
are qualitatively identical to Table 2:  the VDC for M2 exceeds that for the interest rate
only when the TS specification is used.  The switch to a broader measure of money
impacts the results for several other countries.  For instance, for the Netherlands and for
Singapore the VDC for M2 does not exceed that of the interest rate even though it did for
M1.  The results for Portugal indicate that M2 has a greater explanatory power than the
interest rate when the DS specification is used.  Using M1, we found exactly the
opposite:  M1 dominated the interest rate when the TS model is used.  There also are
minor changes in the M1 vs M2 results for Canada, Japan and Norway.  These results
indicate that changes in the monetary aggregate can lead to changes in the outcome, but
not always in a predictable fashion (e.g., moving to a broader measure leads to increased
importance of the interest rate.)  
The most noticeable change between Tables 2 and 3 is that the results for Turkey
indicate that M2 but not M1 plays a prominent role in explaining the variance of output. 
                                                          
16 For a discussion of central bank policies in Germany, see, among others, von Hagen (1999); for
Switzerland, see Bernanke et al. (1999, chapter 4); and for New Zealand, see Evans, et al. (1996) and
Bernanke et al. (1999, chapter 5).  For a general discussion of the role of central banks, see Bernanke et al.
(1999) and Mishkin (1999). 12
This switch may be explained by the significant trend of  “dollarization” in Turkey. 
17
Since Turkey’s M2 includes foreign currency deposits, the behavior of M2 and its
potential impact on real output in Turkey may reflect non-policy actions taken by the
public in how they manage their portfolio of financial assets. For the broader M2 measure
the specification (TS vs DS) and ordering have no effect on the significance on money in
explaining the behavior of output variance.  As we found with M1, the most striking
result in Table 2 is that M2 dominates the interest rate in Germany, New Zealand and
Switzerland.  This finding not only appears to be robust across specifications, but also
across definitions of money.
Overall, the results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the behavior of money may be
more important in explaining real output than some have concluded.
18  While interpreting
results such as these can be likened to a beauty contest, a money-friendly view is that the
results do not reject the notion that money can, in many countries, serve as a useful
indicator of future real output behavior.  Such a conclusion is supported by the data in
half of the countries tested.  Viewing the results slightly differently, the fact that interest
rates dominate money in only half of the countries is not over-whelming support for the
predominant view among most economists and policy makers that interest rates are the
only variable worth considering in policy analysis and deliberations.  
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that money clearly dominates the interest
rate in Germany, New Zealand and Switzerland.
19  This statement also is true for M2 in
                                                          
17 For example, the dollarization ratio based on the IMF data, as measured by the ratio of foreign currency
deposits to GDP, in 1990 was about 5 percent, but this ratio jumped to around 15 percent in 1995 and then
to 20 percent in 2000.
18 Nelson’s (2000) recent results would agree with this assessment.
19 This outcome also appears to be robust to changing the sample period.  At the suggestion of the referee,
we estimated the VAR models using a common sample.  In our attempt to maximize the sample length and13
Turkey.  What makes these countries different from the others?  Is there something
unique about these countries, other than the aforementioned approach to monetary policy,
that generates this outcome?  We investigate this question by comparing the financial
development and structure of these countries with the others used.
The Role of Financial Size and Structure
20
In this section we ask whether Germany, New Zealand and Switzerland are
characterized by some measure of financial market development or structure that helps to
explain our findings.  To do this we utilize the data set constructed by Beck, et al. (1999).  
The Beck, et al. (1999) data set is a comprehensive collection of economic and
social measures used in previous research on economic growth.  We selected several
measures to capture the relative size of the central bank and the banking system,
measured relative to total financial assets and to GDP.  We also gauge the “depth” of the
country’s financial markets with using statistics such as the ratio of liquid liabilities to
GDP and private credit extended by the banking system relative to GDP. Measures of the
structure and efficiency of the countries’ financial system are used, including the 3-bank
concentration ratio, overhead costs and net interest margins of commercial banks.
Finally, we include measures of the relative size of the stock and bond markets.  A
complete listing of the variables used and their mnemonics is provided in Table 4.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
the number of countries, we were able to use only a subset of the twenty countries.  Even so, over a
common sample period of 1977/I-1996/II, we still find that M1 and M2 generate VDCs that are large in
absolute magnitude and relative to the interest rate for Germany and Switzerland.  The only other notable
result from this estimate is that now we find that money, regardless of the specification, plays a secondary
role to the interest rate in explaining output in the U.S.  Complete common-sample estimates are available
upon request.
20 We would like to thank the referee for suggesting this line of inquiry.14
Table 5 presents the summary statistics associated with each financial measure
listed in Table 4, if available, for each country.  For sake of comparison, we separate
Germany, New Zealand and Switzerland from the rest of the countries.  Do the financial
data reveal any discernible pattern that explains our empirical results?  In brief, the
answer is no.  For one thing, there is a great deal of variation in each measure across
countries.  For example, in Germany and Switzerland the assets of the central banks are
less than one percent of total assets (CBA/TA).  In New Zealand, however, the figure is
over six percent.  (For purpose of comparison, the figure for the U.S. is 2.91 percent.)
Glancing down this column reveals that Germany and Switzerland have among the
lowest measures in this category.  Even so, similarly low measures are reported for
France and the Netherlands, two countries for which money was not found to exert much
influence relative to interest rates.  The measure of deposit bank assets relative to total
(DBA/TA) indicates less dispersal among countries, but no clear pattern emerges that
would distinguish one country from another.  So, size of the central bank and of the
commercial banking system relative to the whole financial system does not appear as a
likely explanation for our empirical results.
When measures of the financial system relative to GDP are considered, the size of
the financial markets relative to GDP in Switzerland is larger than the average.  Although
“central bank assets to GDP” seem extraordinary, the other three measures all register the
largest values of any country in the sample.  Still, the fact that such is not found for
Germany and New Zealand suggests that this characteristic isn’t unique and is not an
explanation for finding that money explains the behavior of real output better than
interest rates.15
Is there any evidence in measures of financial market structure and efficiency that
solve the puzzle?  The statistics under this umbrella heading presented in Table 5 suggest
that the answer is no.  Regardless of the specific measure used, whether it is the three-
bank concentration ratio, measures of efficiency or size of the stock and bond markets,
there is no apparent pattern that accounts for the findings in Tables 2 and 3.  
IV.  CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the empirical relation between money, interest rates and
output across a sample of diverse economies.  Previous analyses often rely on U.S. data
or other financially developed countries from a specific region, such as the EU.  In
contrast, the evidence presented in this paper is based on a diverse sample of 20
countries, including industrial countries from different regions as well as economically
and financially less-developed countries.
The results of our analysis suggest that rejecting money as a potentially
informative tool in setting monetary policy is unwarranted.  First, the results suggest that
money often times play a significant role in explaining the behavior of real output.
Across the different specifications used and countries examined, we find that in about
half of the countries money accounts for more of the variance in real output than nominal
interest rates.  Second, our results indicate that concern over the stationarity assumption,
found to be important for the U.S., can alter conclusions about the relative importance of
money and interest rates in other countries as well.
The most robust result reported is the finding that in three countries--Germany,
New Zealand and Switzerland--money, M1 or M2, uniformly explains a greater
percentage of the variation in real output than do interest rates.  Other than the well-16
known bias towards low-inflation policies by the central banks of these countries, a
review of data measuring the size, structure and efficiency individual financial systems
indicates that there is no obvious pattern that explains the empirical results.  Still, this is
likely to be a potentially fruitful avenue of future research.  
In summary, we believe that our results do not support an out-and-out rejection of
money as an informative economic variable when it comes to setting or evaluating
monetary policy.  As if it need be said, there is a clear need for further research.  17
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DATA APPENDIX
All quarterly data are taken from IMF's International Financial Statistics CD-ROM tape.
The following further describes the data and indicates the sample periods for each
country:
Prices: Consumer Price Index (CPI), 1990=100, line 64. 
Money: Narrow money (M1) line 34 and M2=M1+quasi money (line 35)
Output: Real GDP (1990 prices), line 90
Interest rate: Money market rate (line 60B) for all countries, except Mexico and Israel
(T-bill rate, line:60C), and Finland (central bank rate, line:60)























∆RGDP ∆M1 ∆M2 ∆CPI TB
USA 2.88 (0.92) 5.48 (1.77) 7.24 (1.17) 4.28 (0.80) 6.41 (3.32) 1957:4 1998:3
Australia 3.21 (1.25) 10.72 (2.65) 11.44 (1.99) 7.16(1.61) 9.37 (3.76) 1970:1 1996:3
Canada 2.80 (0.86) 8.72 (2.66) 9.24 (1.81) 5.04 (1.15) 8.91 (3.67) 1975:2 1998:2
Finland 2.52 (6.02) 15.72 (10.16) 10.96 (2.21) 6.96 (1.56) 8.12 (1.38) 1970:2 1996:2
France 2.48 (0.71) 7.96 (5.13) 13.08 (6.53) 6.04 (1.38) 8.82 (3.14) 1970:2 1998:2
Germany 3.12 (1.53) 7.88 (1.80) 8.28 (1.96) 3.20 (0.91) 5.52 (2.50) 1960:2 1998:3
Israel 4.56 (2.26) 21.68 (5.02) 19.44 (2.11) 12.96 (1.50) 14.60 (3.60) 1986:2 1998:2
Italy 2.40 (0.86) 11.28 (14.34) 10.76 (9.37) 9.28 (2.09) 12.37 (4.24) 1970:2 1997:2
Japan 5.04 (1.61) 10.80 (2.51) 11.20 (2.83) 4.32 (1.61) 6.41 (3.12) 1957:4 1998:2
Korea 5.48 (21.37) 13.84 (6.88) 18.48 (2.32) 7.92 (1.90) 14.25 (3.94) 1977:1 1998:2
Mexico 2.64 (5.34) 35.84 (8.98) 34.48 (15.56) 28.64 (7.32) 39.75 (31.11) 1987:1 1997:3
Netherlands 2.24 (0.92) 6.40 (1.80) 6.04 (1.27) 2.88 (0.78) 6.52 (2.46) 1977:2 1997:4
New Zealand 2.24 (2.90) 13.80 (10.81) 15.60 (10.13) 5.28 (1.59) 12.71 (5.70) 1983:2 1998:2
Norway 3.44 (4.00) 11.96 (3.67) 9.04 (2.20) 6.04 (1.28) 9.87 (3.50) 1973:2 1998:2
Portugal 2.68 (1.75) 14.84 (11.47) 14.96 (4.11) 11.20 (2.20) 13.33 (4.49) 1981:2 1997:4
Singapore 6.84 (3.44) 8.44 (2.81) 11.84 (1.78) 1.68 (0.63) 4.27 (1.51) 1984:4 1998:1
Spain 2.32 (0.48) 11.68 (2.04) 11.28 (2.63) 9.44 (1.94) 12.39 (4.95) 1974:2 1998:2
Sweden 2.64 (11.96) 3.72 (53.64) 11.96 (8.06) 7.92 (1.60) 9.42 (3.17) 1969:2 1989:4
Switzerland 1.68 (1.25) 4.24 (3.95) 6.48 (2.19) 2.88 (0.84) 3.36 (2.33) 1976:1 1998:2
Turkey 5.56 (27.47) 52.28 (12.31) 60.56 (5.20) 56.28 (5.04) 68.35 (32.30) 1987:2 1998:1
Note: RGDP is real GDP (1990$), M1 is the narrow definition of money, M2 is the broad definition of 
money, CPI is the consumer price index, and TB is a short-term interest rate. ∆ is the difference 
operator. All variables except the interest rate are expressed in logarithms. A more complete 
description of the data and the sample periods is found in the data appendix.
COUNTRY Sample Period





COUNTRY Ordering Stationary without trend Trend Stationary (TS) Difference Stationary (DS)
USA 1 28.17 / 26.82 25.45 / 12.78 2.81 / 21.94
  2 25.40 / 30.37 24.51 / 16.58 2.25 / 13.02
  S.E. 0.03565 0.02488 0.00860
Australia 1 13.10 / 20.56 12.98 / 7.19 7.88 / 8.47
  2 10.52 / 22.05 13.20 / 5.17 7.51 / 8.58
  S.E. 0.03117 0.01936 0.01215
Canada 1 16.08 / 51.44 21.00 / 44.12 1.97 / 10.5
  2 16.10 / 47.95 21.12 / 43.85 13.56 / 11.94
  S.E. 0.02655 0.02446 0.00848
Finland 1 2.50 / 45.13 3.18 / 7.85 1.70 / 21.54
  2 0.68 / 46.24 0.48 / 9.18 1.76 / 23.98
  S.E. 0.03901 0.02284 0.02577
France 1 8.66 / 42.45 4.23 / 36.15 11.45 / 17.15
  2 9.09 / 53.40 5.06 / 48.46 10.37 / 16.23
  S.E. 0.02393 0.02026 0.00692
Germany 1 52.32 / 9.74 27.53 / 4.30 16.01 / 2.92
  2 43.43 / 8.54 22.94 / 4.90 25.58 / 2.26
  S.E. 0.04511 0.03134 0.01514
Israel 1 10.59 / 8.36 10.25 / 9.14 29.6 / 8.53
  2 4.78 / 1.83 5.51 / 2.40 12.36 / 5.88
  S.E. 0.03028 0.02393 0.01980
Italy 1 12.34 / 44.17 13.61 / 45.58 11.46 / 15.59
  2 7.31 / 43.00 7.38 / 46.35 2.44 / 16.67
  S.E. 0.02314 0.02190 0.00857
Japan 1 0.67 / 0.28 0.93 / 0.21 6.94 / 4.77
  2 2.53 / 0.15 3.07 / 0.16 2.68 / 4.59
  S.E. 0.06386 0.06473 0.01617
Korea 1 8.60 / 35.70 6.73 / 35.47 3.76 / 6.13
  2 5.42 / 7.98 4.39 / 9.29 2.94 / 3.23
  S.E. 0.06953 0.06101 0.0498823
Table 2 (continued)
Mexico 1 6.29 / 35.44 13.35 / 18.02 17.36 / 18.00
  2 4.07 / 9.52 8.86 / 16.54 14.46 / 15.70
  S.E. 0.03081 0.02407 0.01986
Netherlands 1 31.00 / 23.68 14.81 / 21.85 10.69 / 9.01
  2 34.17 / 22.90 16.74 / 12.62 7.90 / 3.58
  S.E. 0.01726 0.01482 0.00926
New Zealand 1 20.56 / 24.26 21.78 / 13.53 25.48 / 4.34
  2 34.10 / 6.45 11.04 / 6.54 16.27 / 2.84
  S.E. 0.05654 0.02457 0.02799
Norway 1 7.32 / 30.51 14.06 / 30.33 8.32 / 19.34
  2 6.67 / 13.34 14.22 / 21.49 8.06 / 16.82
  S.E. 0.04337 0.03087 0.02393
Portugal 1 37.23 / 24.02 52.50 / 17.41 11.65 / 16.46
  2 17.63 / 7.10 49.74 / 24.19 7.71 / 11.98
  S.E. 0.01640 0.01326 0.01424
Singapore 1 57.23 / 33.65 36.20 / 28.88 19.44 / 6.85
  2 29.09 / 30.73 23.15 / 29.54 21.31 / 5.84
  S.E. 0.08495 0.02432 0.01567
Spain 1 5.41 / 14.03 6.85 / 1.76 22.35 / 7.69
  2 6.91 / 14.11 4.33 / 3.16 20.16 / 11.45
  S.E. 0.03454 0.02458 0.00440
Sweden 1 16.79 / 19.45 10.95 / 11.12 13.72 / 4.53
  2 8.71 / 16.91 6.37 / 8.07 15.64 / 1.94
  S.E. 0.02496 0.02328 0.02423
Switzerland 1 59.61 / 16.27 42.95 / 17.54 26.16 / 11.01
  2 53.33 / 13.94 39.19 / 12.42 21.61 / 8.46
  S.E. 0.03620 0.03060 0.01094
Turkey 1 12.09 / 35.02 17.96 / 32.06 20.08 / 18.59
  2 14.59 / 34.75 23.78 / 30.95 19.19 / 21.38
  S.E. 0.04056 0.04044 0.04805
         
Notes: 
Ordering 1: TB, M1, CPI, RGDP
Ordering 2: RGDP, CPI, TB, M1





COUNTRY Ordering Stationary without trend Trend Stationary (TS) Difference Stationary (DS)
USA 1 9.74 / 36.72 26.76 / 16.54 4.70 / 25.10
  2 5.25 / 36.66 19.58 / 15.62 3.46 / 11.76
  S.E. 0.03714 0.02721 0.00861
Australia 1 13.10 / 20.56 12.98 / 7.19 9.47 / 5.97
  2 10.53 / 22.05 13.20 / 5.17 7.18 / 6.19
  S.E. 0.03121 0.01879 0.01216
Canada 1 5.46 / 69.95 14.71 / 48.23 4.84 / 7.84
  2 4.23 / 64.84 13.68 / 51.65 3.75 / 10.02
  S.E. 0.02959 0.02404 0.00845
Finland 1 22.51 / 40.14 18.31 / 9.78 4.07 / 21.48
  2 10.82 / 40.39 3.98 / 11.05 1.54 / 24.13
  S.E. 0.03521 0.02447 0.02579
France 1 5.96 / 47.33 7.93 / 34.29 10.75 / 15.50
  2 3.68 / 59.15 3.79 / 45.82 7.06 / 14.68
  S.E. 0.02285 0.01975 0.00694
Germany 1 36.27 / 13.11 37.66 / 4.58 14.92 / 2.78
  2 27.68 / 10.57 33.37 / 2.41 15.24 / 2.08
  S.E. 0.04369 0.02923 0.01509
Israel 1 10.08 / 13.59 8.94 / 14.00 12.17 / 9.41
  2 4.31 / 3.90 5.60 / 4.22 11.21 / 6.70
  S.E. 0.02524 0.02382 0.01976
Italy 1 13.13 / 33.49 10.36 / 50.40 8.67 / 15.68
  2 6.70 / 26.66 6.54 / 40.32 3.87 / 15.60
  S.E. 0.02011 0.02129 0.00858
Japan 1 7.99 / 1.07 7.46 / 3.87 12.88 / 4.32
  2 4.45 / 0.12 4.68 / 1.15 9.90 / 3.91
  S.E. 0.05681 0.05723 0.01585
Korea 1 4.31 / 42.80 4.92 / 41.90 2.07 / 5.68
  2 4.03 / 15.41 4.57 / 19.44 1.79 / 5.71
  S.E. 0.07344 0.06480 0.0505025
Table 3 (continued)
Mexico 1 7.66 / 36.15 14.56 / 44.40 19.79 / 21.81
  2 5.64 / 6.45 3.98 / 12.33 9.28 / 20.07
  S.E. 0.02943 0.02592 0.01965
Netherlands 1 17.22 / 43.95 20.23 / 21.99 4.94 / 7.94
  2 10.11 / 40.90 11.19 / 14.05 2.90 / 2.51
  S.E. 0.01758 0.01485 0.00923
New Zealand 1 12.37 / 22.13 34.84 / 12.72 26.43 / 9.74
  2 22.67 / 3.48 13.06 / 3.54 13.35 / 2.39
  S.E. 0.04008 0.02751 0.02729
Norway 1 1.01 / 46.67 7.54 / 8.71 6.12 / 15.02
  2 2.57 / 31.38 10.77 / 4.84 4.17 / 13.32
  S.E. 0.04776 0.03200 0.02390
Portugal 1 3.71 / 70.88 4.68 / 69.07 20.54 / 12.83
  2 1.86 / 62.92 2.11 / 64.98 20.18 / 9.27
  S.E. 0.02156 0.02144 0.01528
Singapore 1 26.38 / 29.15 14.81 / 25.17 7.39 / 10.08
  2 32.80 / 31.87 14.36 / 25.78 6.41 / 9.46
  S.E. 0.03932 0.02099 0.01596
Spain 1 1.00 / 31.89 5.34 / 2.19 7.39 / 8.01
  2 0.34 / 29.36 2.89 / 2.69 10.44 / 10.87
  S.E. 0.03598 0.02610 0.00439
Sweden 1 3.06 / 30.44 3.60 / 19.13 1.18 / 5.34
  2 3.15 / 22.12 3.97 / 11.86 1.36 / 2.84
  S.E. 0.02451 0.02258 0.02285
Switzerland 1 47.00 / 17.45 45.73 / 17.23 15.35 / 7.53
  2 46.00 / 16.60 46.39 / 15.78 15.02 / 5.62
  S.E. 0.02717 0.02697 0.01080
Turkey 1 25.65 / 19.21 35.99 / 27.47 41.72 / 18.27
  2 10.89 / 5.55 35.37 / 7.45 40.39 / 13.49
  S.E. 0.04690 0.03845 0.05139
         
Notes: 
Ordering 1: TB, M2, CPI, RGDP
Ordering 2: RGDP, CPI, TB, M2
Variable definitions and sources are documented in Table 1 and the data appendix.  S.E. is the standard error.2627
Table 4
Description of Financial Development Variables
Variable         Definition Description/Page reference to Beck, et al. (1999)
CBA/TA Central Bank Assets to Central bank defined as institutions that
Total Financial Assets perform duties of central banks.  Total financial
assets equal sum of central bank, deposit money
bank and other financial institutions assets. End-of-
period.  Pages 5-6
DBA/TA Deposit Money Bank Assets Deposit money banks are all financial institutions
to Total Financial Assets whose liabilities are in the form of deposits 
transferable by check or otherwise used in making
payments.  End-of-period.  Page 6
CBA/GDP Central Bank Assets to GDP Central bank assets defined above.  GDP as 
measured in IMF.  Page 6
DBA/GDP Deposit money banks assets Deposit money banks, GDP as defined above.
to GDP Page 6
LL/GDP Liquid Liabilities to GDP Equals sum of currency, demand deposits and 
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other 
financial intermediaries relative to GDP.  Pages 6-7
PC/GDP Private Credit by Deposit Money Claims on private sector by deposit money banks
Banks to GDP relative to GDP.  Page 7
CONC 3-Bank Concentration Ratio Ratio of three largest banks’ assets to total banking
sector assets.  Page 11
OVER/TA Overhead Costs to Total Assets Equals accounting value of bank’s overhead costs 
relative to its total assets.  End-of-period.  Page 10
NIM/TA Net Interest Margin to Total  Equals accounting value of value of bank’s net
Assets interest revenue relative to total assets.  End-of-
period.  Page 10
CAP/GDP Stock Market Capitalization Value of listed shares on country’s stock market
to GDP relative to GDP.  Values are end-of-year.  Page 17.
DEBT/GDP Long-Term Private Debt Issues Equity issues, both long-term and debt issues,
to GDP relative to GDP.  Nominal measure.  Page 18.
_______________________
Source:  Beck, et al. (1999).28
Table 5
Measures of Financial Size, Structure and Efficiency
STRUCTURE AND EFFICIENCY
COUNTRY CBA/TA DBA/TA CBA/GDPDMBA/GDP LL/GDP PC/GDP CONC OVER/TANIM/TA CAP/GDP DEBT/GDP
Germany 0.95 93.43 1.14 110.12 64.10 92.26 44.16 2.77 2.46 18.64 37.43
New Zealand 6.12 66.62 3.91 48.84 55.43 54.17 76.94 2.75 2.51 40.47 0.00
Switzerland 0.77 81.27 1.45 154.31 138.18 177.64 73.92 4.94 1.55 70.59 62.09
Australia 2.86 55.05 2.88 56.11 56.42 81.23 67.44 2.61 1.92 43.10 13.76
Canada 4.68 60.87 4.20 53.68 68.53 76.63 58.01 2.44 1.75 45.54 8.62
Finland na na 1.55 68.14 51.09 66.99 86.46 1.65 1.60 18.44 39.09
France 0.74 72.24 1.06 93.87 68.02 90.89 40.66 4.41 3.51 19.77 41.24
Israel na na 11.17 97.01 62.94 50.54 86.39 3.82 3.30 28.89 0.00
Italy na na 11.98 69.39 69.70 50.50 35.81 3.56 3.60 11.87 28.10
Japan 1.80 50.12 4.19 119.16 168.31 169.26 20.99 1.39 1.75 73.01 29.99
Korea, Rep. of 3.11 57.03 2.49 48.35 46.15 80.90 33.40 2.48 2.29 24.55 32.19
Mexico 17.60 48.78 7.69 19.18 23.37 17.61 59.06 5.03 5.35 14.55 0.97
Netherlands 0.46 51.42 0.84 93.66 81.76 127.97 73.34 1.00 1.46 40.92 16.56
Norway 2.38 54.76 2.88 63.13 53.83 88.51 84.54 2.48 3.13 15.19 19.17
Portugal na na 14.07 79.80 73.19 63.21 45.27 2.56 3.46 7.75 10.59
Singapore na na na 89.63 102.71 94.80 72.91 1.43 2.09 123.06 3.65
Spain 7.14 85.99 7.30 87.45 72.85 72.02 46.44 3.49 3.76 18.08 9.28
Sweden 5.50 41.23 7.25 54.12 49.82 108.94 88.57 3.07 2.66 38.09 57.56
Turkey 34.38 59.61 9.26 18.64 21.82 13.82 44.77 6.36 9.37 6.14 0.69
United States 2.91 47.15 4.66 75.13 62.61 130.74 18.21 3.65 3.88 58.18 52.58
Notes:  All measures are in percentages.  Source:  Beck, et al. (1999)  Definitions of the measures used are provided in the data appendix 
to this paper.
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